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COMMONWEALTH v. ONE 1958 PLYMOUTH SEDAN:
SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN FORFEITURE
PROCEEDINGS FOR LIQUOR
LAW VIOLATIONS
In Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan' the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court recently held that the rule excluding from a criminal prosecution
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure have no appli-
cation in a proceeding for forfeiture of an automobile used in violating the
state liquor laws. In this case, two enforcement officers of the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board,2 while stationed at a point in New Jersey across the
Delaware River from Philadelphia, observed a black Plymouth sedan, the back
end of which was unusually low. The officers followed the vehicle across a
bridge into Pennsylvania. Acting without a warrant, they proceeded to stop
and search the car. As a result of the search they discovered 375 bottles of
whiskey and wine which did not bear Pennsylvania tax sealsY The car and
its contents were seized and a petition was filed in quarter sessions court to
have the vehicle forfeited. That court denied the petition and ordered the car
returned on the ground that the evidence was obtained as the result of an
illegal search and seizure4 in violation of the fourth amendment. This decision
1. 414 Pa. 540,, 201 A.2d 427, cert. granted 379 U.S. 927 (1964). This Note was
written before the Supreme Court heard oral argument on the case. See U.S.L. WEEK
4387 (April 27, 1965), for the Court's unanimous decision reversing the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and remanding the case to that court for further proceedings.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-209 (1952) provides:
Such employes of the board as are designated "enforcement officers" or
"investigators" are hereby declared to be peace officers and are hereby given
police power and authority throughout the Commonwealth to arrest on view,
except in private homes, without warrant, any person actually engaged in the
unlawful sale, importation, manufacture or transportation, or having unlawful
possession of liquor, alcohol or malt or brewed beverages, contrary to the provi-
sions of this act or any other law of this Commonwealth. Such officers and in-
vestigators shall have power and authority, upon reasonable and probable cause,
to search for and to seize without warrant or process, except in private homes,
any liquor, alcohol and malt or brewed beverages unlawfully possessed, manu-
factured, sold, imported, or transported, and any stills, equipment, material,
utensils, vehicles, boats, vessels, animals, aircraft, or any of them, which are or
have been used in the unlawful manufacture, sale, importation or transportation
of the same. ...
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 authorizes a state to prohibit the transportation
or importation of intoxicating liquors into its jurisdiction in violation of its laws.
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Many state constitutions have a similar provision. See, e.g.,
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), held that the fourth amendment
must be construed in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as individual
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was reversed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court which held that the search
and seizure were founded upon probable cause. On appeal the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the historical basis of the concept
of forfeiture and to evaluate its status in the development of the law of search
and seizure.
Forfeiture has been known to the law for thousands of years, and its
peculiar historical background has had a marked effect upon virtually every
aspect of the modem forfeiture proceeding.5 At common law there were two
forms of forfeiture proceedings. The first involved forfeiture of a felon's prop-
erty incident to a criminal proceeding against him.0 Under the early law of
England, the real and personal property of all felons was forfeited. 7 However,
the proceeding was in personam in nature and the forfeiture did not attach
until the offender was convicted. The second type of forfeiture was created
by statute and was in rem in nature. It attached to the res itself, as in the case
of proceedings in rem in admiralty." The basis of this second type of forfeiture
proceeding was the concept of deodand, which decreed that any chattel which
caused a person's death be forfeited to the crown. This concept probably had
its origin in the Mosaic Code.9 People in medieval times were inclined to
endow objects with a personality and to attribute to them a sense of responsi-
bility. If an object in motion caused a death, the object, rather than its owner,
was made the defendant in the action. This particular anachronism has
lingered with remarkable tenacity in the modern law of forfeiture.
Although deodand was never a part of the common law of this country,
its counterpart was found in the early Customs and Internal Revenue Acts.' 0
At the end of the seventeenth century, admiralty jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
was vested in the Provincial Council,1 ' but forfeiture cases under the Naviga-
tion Acts were tried in the common law courts. 12 Since the time of these
rights and therefore the search and seizure of an automobile, without a warrant, is valid
if the officer has reasonable cause to believe the vehicle is carrying contraband. The
application of this rule, however, is often exceedingly complicated. Possibility alone
cannot justify stopping and searching all automobiles being lawfully used on the high-
ways in the hope that some criminals will be found. See also Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
5. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (1881).
6. JONES, BLACKSTONE'S COMM. 2266 (1915).
7. DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 495 (1963).
8. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
9. "When an ox gore a man or woman and they die, he shall be stoned and his
flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of the ox shall be quit." Exodus 21:28.
10. The Court in Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921),
recognized the analogy of forfeiture to deodand in the early acts.
11. LOYD, EARLY COURTS OF PA. 68 (1910).
12. The Fame was condemned in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1726.
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early ties with admiralty, the United States Supreme Court has uniformly held
a libel action for forfeiture to be an in rem proceeding.' 3 This holding has
been criticized as being a pure legal fiction and useless relic of the past.1 4 How-
ever, in Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States,'5 Mr. Justice McKenna de-
fended this procedure on the ground that it is the most convenient method of
approach in effecting a confiscation. He went on to say that "whether the
reason for § 3450 [now § 7301 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code requiring
forfeiture of any conveyance used to conceal or remove goods with the intent
to defraud the United States of any tax thereon] be artificial or real, it
is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country
to be now displaced."'16
Not until the 1920's did forfeitures play a large role in the law of this
country. It is estimated that between 1920 and 1930, the United States Gov-
ernment seized and reported for forfeiture 52,000 automobiles, 1400 boats, and
other property valued at $100,000,000.Y7 Since that time the number of statutes
providing for the forfeiture of property used as an instrumentality for violation
of state or federal laws has been steadily increasing,'8 and the large number
of reported cases attest to their extensive utilization.
While in the instant case, Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,
both the appellant and the Commonwealth directed their arguments chiefly to
the validity of the search and seizure, the supreme court dismissed this ques-
tion without deciding it. The court concluded that the rule excluding illegally
obtained evidence did not apply to a forfeiture proceeding, since such an
action is in the nature of a civil proceeding in rem rather than a criminal
proceeding. 19
A proceeding in rem is directed not against the individual, but against
the property which is utilized to violate the particular law, the property being
assigned a power of participation in the offense and being thus viewed as an
offender.2 0 Accordingly, the property is found guilty and condemned as
4 PA. STATUTES AT LARGE 1682-1801, at 422-26, 429-31 (1897). See also the Pa. Merchant,
condemned by a jury in the court of common pleas at Chester, 1695, RECORD OF THE
COURT OF CHESTER COUNTY 1681-1697, at 366-69 (1910).
13. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931)
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbin's Distillery v.
United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1887); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1 (1827).
14. See McDonald, Automobile Forfeitures and the Eighteenth Amendment, 10
TEXAS L. REV. 140 (1932); Statutory Penalties-A Legal Hybrid, 51 HARv. L. REV.
1092 (1938).
15. 245 U.S. 505 (1921).
16. Id. at 511.
17. See Williams, Forfeiture Laws, 16 A.B.A.J. 572 (1930).
18. For a typical list of statutes providing for forfeiture proceedings see State v.
Sherry, 86 N.J. Super. 296, 206 A.2d 773 (1965).
19. 414 Pa. 540, 542, 201 A.2d 427, 429 (1964).
20. See United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210 (1844); The Palmyra,
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though conscious instead of insentient.2 1 The forfeiture is made ancillary to the
criminal offense. However, analysis reveals that a libel proceeding in which
forfeiture of property is sought is not a typical civil proceeding, but is more
in the nature of a criminal sanction.2 2 In Boyd v. United States2 the Supreme
Court recognized this distinction: "We are also clearly of opinion that pro-
ceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's prop-
erty by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form,
are in their nature criminal.1
2 4
A civil offense involves a wrong or breach of duty between individuals and
civil proceedings are remedial in nature; a criminal offense involves a public
wrong and the objective behind a criminal proceeding is largely punitive in
nature. If an objective guide to classification is whether the purpose of the
proceeding is remedial or punitive, forfeiture proceedings clearly should be
labeled criminal. If the statute were truly remedial the defendant would be
permitted to show that the value of the property to be forfeited would exceed
any reasonable compensation to society for the wrong done. Since this is not
permitted, the proceeding would seem to be punitive in purpose and therefore
criminal under this test.
To sustain the proposition that an illegal search and seizure does not
preclude the possibility of forfeiting a vehicle which has been used to violate
the liquor laws, the court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan relied upon two Su-
preme Court decisions. In United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile,
25
the vehicle used to conceal illicitly distilled liquor was seized by a state pro-
hibition agent. In a proceeding for forfeiture of the automobile the agent's
authority to make such a seizure was challenged. The Court, while recognizing
that the agent acted without legal authority, nevertheless held that where prop-
erty declared forfeited by a federal statute is seized under such circum-
25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1 (1827) ; United States v. One 1947 Chrysler Brougham Sedan,
74 F. Supp. 970 (E.D. Mich. 1947); United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe, 36 F.
Supp. 788 (D. Mass. 1941).
21. For a full analysis of the derivation of in rem proceedings see C. J. Hendry
Co. v. Moore, 381 U.S. 133 (1943).
22. See United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 220 F. Supp. 841 (E.D.
Wis. 1963); United States v. One 1947 Oldsmobile Sedan, 104 F. Supp. 159 (D.N.J.
1952). Contra. Lord v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963). See also Mack v.
Westbrook, 148 Ga. 690, 98 S.E. 339 (1919), where the court succinctly observed:
A proceeding in rem is in effect a proceeding against the owner as well as a
proceeding against the goods, for it is his breach of the law which has to be
proven to establish the forfeiture, and it is his property which is sought to
be forfeited.
Id. at 697, 98 S.E. at 343.
23. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
24. Id. at 633-34.
25. 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
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stances, the United States can adopt the seizure as though it were originally
authorized.2 6
In a similar case, Dodge v. United States,27 the Court upheld the right
of the United States to forfeit a boat used to carry liquor across navigable
waters where the seizure had been by local officials acting without authority.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, the Court said that seizure of the boat
by an unauthorized person would not preclude the Government from bringing
a subsequent action for its condemnation and sale because the Government
could adopt the seizure and give it retroactive effect.
28
In applying these decisions to the fact situation in One 1958 Plymouth
two significant facts should be noted. In the first place, both decisions were
concerned with the effect of an illegal seizure on the jurisdiction of the court
-not with the exclusion of evidence obtained as the result of an illegal
search and seizure. One can assert a "right" to property because of his owner-
ship and the fact that he asserts his ownership right illegally will not affect
his ownership right. The following example illustrates the proposition: B
steals a watch from A and sells it to C who is an innocent purchaser. If A
assaults C to gain possession of the watch, his substantive ownership rights in
the watch are not reduced, though he may be liable in a tort action.
An illegal seizure would not affect the jurisdiction of the court in the
absence of a statute providing otherwise. Thus, even where an automobile
is seized illegally, that fact alone should not bar its forfeiture if there is suffi-
cient admissible evidence to establish the occurrence of the act upon which
the forfeiture is grounded. That this was the distinction being made in the
Dodge case could be argued from the words of Mr. Justice Holmes:
The owner of the property suffers nothing that he would not
have suffered if the seizure had been authorized. However, effected,
it brings the object within the power of the Court, which is an end
that the law seeks to attain, and justice to the owner is as safe in the
one case as in the other. The jurisdiction of the Court was secured
by the fact that the res was in the possession of the prohibition di-
rector when the libel was filed.. . . We can see no reason for doubting
the soundness of these principles when the forfeiture is dependent
upon subsequent events any more than when it occurs at the time of
the seizure, although it was argued that there was a difference.
26. See also Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 339 (1842); The
Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 60 (1819) ; Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 116
(1818).
27. 272 U.S. 530 (1926).
28. See, however, Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), where the seizure
of a vessel on the high seas was forbidden by the terms of a treaty between the United
States and Great Britain. It was held that the United States lacked authority to ratify
the seizure because by imposing upon itself the limitations set forth in the treaty
authority to make the seizure in its own right was lacking.
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They seem to us to embody good sense. The exclusion of evidence
obtained by an unlawful search and seizure stands on a different
ground.
2 9
The second factor to be noted is that since both the decisions discussed
above were prior to Elkins v. United States,30 neither case was concerned
with the introduction of evidence considered unlawful under the fourth amend-
ment. At the time of these decisions there was no constitutional restriction on
the admission of evidence illegally obtained by local officials and turned over
to federal authorities. Provided the tainted evidence was obtained without
participation of the federal officers, it could legally be handed to them on a
"silver platter" and thereby become admissible in the federal courts. The
Elkins case struck down the "silver platter" doctrine, ruling that evidence
illegally obtained by state agents and turned over to federal officers is no
longer admissible in federal courts in criminal actions. 31 Thus, if the exclu-
sionary rule is applicable to in rem proceedings brought by the Government,
it could be argued that the two cases discussed above are inapplicable with
regard to the question of whether illegal evidence should be excluded from
such proceedings.
32
Federal decisions early held that the legislature may, in a proper case,
validly subject the offender to both a criminal prosecution and to a civil suit
to recover a penalty or effect a forfeiture; this on the theory that criminal and
civil liability is but one sanction enforceable in two proceedings.3 The fiction
of separating one offense into a civil-criminal dichotomy has been a fertile
source of legal inconsistencies. 34 An examination of the federal decisions deal-
ing with forfeiture proceedings reveals an area fraught not only with complex-
ities and ambiguity, but also a lack of uniform interpretation of prior de-
cisions.35 Questions of double jeopardy and res judicata are frequent where
29. 272 U.S. at 532.
30. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
31. The fourth amendment protects only against "unreasonable governmental in-
trusion" into a person's privacy. Where evidence is gathered by private individuals in
a manner which would be unlawful if done by governmental authority, there is no
invasion of the constitutional security and the evidence is admissible. See Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) ; Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 299 N.Y.S.2d
61 (2nd Dept. 1962) ; Walker v. Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951).
32. See e.g., Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
33. See in re Leszynsky, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8279 (C.C.N.Y. 1879) ; United States
v. Mt. Clemens Beverage Co., 23 F.2d 885 (D.C. Mich. 1927). For criticism of this
view see Stout v. State, 36 Okla. 774, 130 Pac. 553 (1913).
34. See Statutory Penalties-A Legal Hybrid, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1938).
35. Compare Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886), with Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) and Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,
282 U.S. 568 (1931). In Coffey the Court held that a judgment of acquittal in a prior
criminal proceeding operated as a bar to any in rem forfeiture based upon the existence
of the same facts. The Mitchell case held that an action following a criminal acquittal
would be precluded only if its objective was punishment. Forfeiture of goods was held
1965]
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there are multiple proceedings involving the offending objects as well as the
offending persons.3 6 Acquittal of the driver of the car in a criminal action
would not necessarily affect the forfeiture proceeding because here a different
defendant, the vehicle itself, is being proceeded against. While it is perfectly
clear that the vehicle could do nothing without the human agency, who has
already been found innocent, still the car might be adjudged guilty. The fiction
involved here has been criticized on the ground that if carried to its logical
end, the rights of innocent owners or mortgagees might be disregarded once
the "guilty" chattel has been obtained.3 7 Thus, a stolen car, used to violate
the liquor laws could be forfeited even though its owner is free from any
negligence or guilt.3 8 Questions of statutory construction" and due process 40
have also added to the confusion in judicial interpretation.
Perhaps the most controversial issue, however, has been the effect upon
the forfeiture proceeding of an illegal search and seizure. The various circuit
to be remedial rather than punitive. Various Items of Personal Property clouded the
issue further by holding that double jeopardy does not apply to an in rem proceeding
since there the property itself is on trial.
36. See note 35 supra. The division of authority in regard to double jeopardy and
res judicata seems to be due primarily to the many variations in the facts and cir-
cumstances present in each case. See also 51 HARv. L. REv. 1092 (1938) ; 31 CoLuM. L.
REv. 291 (1931).
37. See 34 HIv. L. REv. 200 (1920). In Pennsylvania it is within the discretion
of the court as to whether in a forfeiture proceeding innocent owners or lien holders
should be protected. Commonwealth v. One 1962 Chrysler Hardtop Sedan, 201 Pa.
Super. 478, 193 A.2d 636 (1963) ; Commonwealth v. One 1957 Chevrolet Sedan, 191
Pa. Super. 179, 155 A.2d 438 (1959).
38. 53 Stat. 1291 (1939); 49 U.S.C. 782 (1951) provides that property is not
subject to forfeiture where it was obtained from the owner by a violation of state or
federal criminal law. In United States v. One 1941 Chrysler Brougham Sedan, 74 F.
Supp. 970 (E.D. Mich. 1947), a car was obtained from an automobile rental service
after an agreement was signed providing that it would not be used in violation of
federal laws. It was subsequently used to violate the narcotics laws. The court denied
the owner's claim that a car so obtained by the bailee was taken from him in a manner
entitling him to benefit from the exception. The court distinguished between false
pretenses and larceny, and held the former to be no grounds for dismissal.
39. Some courts hold that these statutes are remedial and should be liberally
construed according to the intention of the legislature. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S.
1 (1889); United States v. One Ford 4-Door Galaxie Sedan, 202 F. Supp. 841, (E.D.
Tenn. 1962); United States v. One Saxon Automobile, 257 Fed. 251 (1919). Other
courts placing emphasis upon the criminal nature of the proceedings, adhere to the
general rule that criminal statutes should be construed strictly. United States v. One
Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219 (1939) ; United States v. One 1946 Mercury Sedan Automobile,
199 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. One 1947 Oldsmobile Sedan, 104 F. Supp.
159 (D.N.J. 1952).
40. Since forfeiture is relied on not so much to punish wrongdoers as to apply
a drastic remedy for law violation, those in charge of enforcing the laws have desired
to forfeit all property wrongfully used, without regard to its ownership. The constitu-
tionality of statutes which permit the confiscation of vehicles despite the owners' in-
nocence have been repeatedly upheld. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 405 (1926) ; Gold-
smith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921) ; United States v. Stowell, 133
U.S. 1 (1888) ; Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1887).
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courts are in disagreement as to whether the tainted evidence will be admitted.
In the instant case the court cited several Fifth Circuit cases for the propo-
sition that the legality of the search and seizure cannot be raised in a for-
feiture proceeding. 41 Other circuits, however, are of the opinion that a motion
to suppress is proper in a civil forfeiture action.42 In United States v. 5,
608.30 in United States Coin and Currency,43 the court followed the ruling
in Boyd that forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and held that
a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence is proper, even though the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unlike the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure,44 do not expressly provide for such a motion.
Contraband property may fall into either of two distinct classes. First,
there is property which can have no lawful use when in the hands of the
particular defendant, such as narcotics. 45 Secondly, there is property which
is, in and of itself lawful, but which can become contraband because of the way
in which it is used. The automobile used for the transportation of illicit liquor
is an example of the second class. In cases involving property of the latter
type there must be testimony as to how the property was used in order for
it to be classified as contraband. 46 Therefore, the validity of the search and
41. Martin v. United States, 277 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Carey,
272 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1959); Grogan v. United States, 261 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1958);
Sanders v. United States, 201 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1933). While each decision contains
language to support this interpretation, the courts at times seem to confuse the problem
of the effect of the illegal seizure on the court's jurisdiction with the effect of such
seizure on the admissibility of the evidence. An earlier Fifth Circuit case, Walker v.
United States, 125 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1942), held that where agents had gone upon
the premises without a search warrant, found a still and then arrested the claimant,
evidence obtained by the illegal search and seizure would not be admissible in a libel
proceeding for the forfeiture of two automobiles seized in the inclosure in which the
still was located.
42. The First Circuit in Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (lst Cir. 1938),
held that admission in a forfeiture proceeding of evidence obtained under an illegally
issued search warrant was reversible error. This decision was reaffirmed in United
States v. One 1960 Lincoln Two-Door Hard-Top, 195 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1961).
United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2nd Cir. 1949), adopted the rule that a motion
to suppress should be granted in a libel where there is no proof that the search was
conducted on the basis of reasonable hearsay. The decision held that before the contra-
band is admissible in evidence the government must show that there were sufficient
factors present to lead a reasonable man to believe that the car involved in the libel
actually carried such contraband. See also United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th
Cir. 1946); Brock v. United States, 12 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1926); Lassoff v. Gray,
207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
43. 326 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1964).
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
45. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the Court held that where
possession was the basis for conviction in a federal court, the defendant would be allowed
to make a motion to suppress evidence even if from a strict legal viewpoint he had no
property or possessory interest in the evidence. See also United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951).
46. See Hemenway & Moser Co. v. Funk, 100 Utah 72, 106 P.2d 779 (1940).
1965]
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seizure should be a proper issue in determining the admissibility of evidence.
The distinction between the two types of contraband property has been recog-
nized in cases involving the right to trial by jury. Where property of the
first category is involved it has been held that there is no right to jury trial
47
while there is such a right where the res is property of the second type.48
The court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan cited United States v. Jeffers49
and Trupiano v. United States"0 for the proposition that where the illegally
seized evidence is contraband the claimant is not entitled to have the property
returned to him. It should be noted, however, that both decisions were con-
cerned with property of the first category-narcotics and illegal distilling
equipment. Both of these were prohibited from having these items in their
possession by statute. In United States v. Burns,51 on the other hand, it was
held that liquor, illegally seized from a vessel could not be used as evidence
that it was being illegally transported into the United States. Such evidence
could not be used to establish the fact that the liquor was contraband, and
the cargo was therefore ordered returned.
52
One of the factors contributing to the conflicting decisions in this area
is the many definitions and interpretations of the concept of "property right."
53
The term "contraband" is sometimes used in the loose sense of property which
a person has no right to possess. The court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
reasoned that since, under the Liquor Code, there were no property rights
in the automobile after it crossed the state line, there could be no illegal
search and seizure within the prohibition of the fourth amendment. This is
the same specious reasoning used in colonial days to support the general
warrants for seizure of smuggled goods, emphasizing the thing sought for
seizure rather than the right of the people to be secure in their possessions.
The argument is fallacious for a number of reasons. First, it proceeds
on the premise that since the proceeding is against the property itself, and
since an inanimate object can have no constitutional rights, there can be no
constitutional questions involved. This is merely an extension of the fiction
upon which the entire proceeding is based. Secondly, if one may not have
47. PomwERoy, EQuITy JURISPRUDENCE § 1941 (4 ed. 1919).
48. State v. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car, 120 Ore. 254, 251 Pac. 701 (1926)
Keeter v. State, 82 Okla. 89, 198 Pac. 866 (1921); Colon v. Lisk, 153 N.Y. 188, 47
N.E. 302 (1897).
49. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
50. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
51. 4 F.2d 131 (S.D. Fla. 1925).
52. Accord. Brock v. United States, 12 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1926); Petition of
Shoemaker, 9 F.2d 170 (D.C. Pa. 1925).
53. In State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 Pac. 950 (1929) it was held that contra-
band liquor could still be the subject of larceny on the theory that ownership remains
in the unlawful possessor until confiscation by the state even though a statute provided
that no property rights shall exist in intoxicating liquors.
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property rights in contraband, why does the Liquor Code, in express terms,
forbid the search and seizure of a dwelling house without a warrant ?54 This
provision recognizes the possibility of possessory rights in liquor beyond
the power of an arbitrary search and seizure. Since no search may legally
deprive a man of his lawful possessions, it is a circular argument to say that
a vehicle used for the illegal transportation of liquor is contraband and for that
reason cannot be possessed. The fallacy of the argument is that the conclusion
ultimately to be reached, namely, whether the vehicle is contraband, is assumed
by the court and included among the premises from which it is supposed to
follow. A similar argument was presented in the Jeffers case where the
Court decided that Congress, in abrogating property rights in certain goods,
had intended such action merely as an aid in fighting organized crime, not
to abolish the defendant's property rights in the contraband for purposes
of applying the exclusionary rule of evidence.
The Supreme Court has never passed on the precise question of whether
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is admissible in a civil
proceeding.5 6 Language in a number of Supreme Court decisions, plus the
fact that the scope of constitutional protection of individual rights is con-
tinually being broadened, would suggest that such evidence may be held in-
admissible by the Court even in a civil case.
In the Boyd case the Government brought forfeiture proceedings against
thirty-five cases of imported plate glass upon which no customs duties had
been paid. The defendants were ordered to produce certain invoices, under
penalty of being bound by the prosecutor's statement of their contents. The
Court said that since the forfeiture proceedings are of a quasi-criminal nature,
"they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and of that portion of the Fifth
Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself ....
54. See note 1 supra.
55. It has been the experience of our enforcement officers that the best way
to strike at commercialized crime is through the pocketbooks of the criminals
who engage in it. By decreasing the profits which make illicit activity of this
type possible, crime itself can also be decreased. Vessels, vehicles, and aircraft
may be termed "the operating tools" of dope peddlers, counterfeiters, and
gangsters. They represent tangible major capital investments to criminals whose
liquid assets, if any, are frequently not accessible to the Government.
H.R. REu. No. 1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939).
56. Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392,
(1963) noted that the effect of the fourth amendment in civil cases in the federal courts
is not totally settled. See also, Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927), where the
Court left open the question of whether the ruling in Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S.
530 (1926), would be followed if the seizure by federal officers had been unlawful.




Twenty-eight years later, Weeks v. United States55 firmly established
the exclusionary rule, holding that evidence obtained by federal officials in
violation of the fourth amendment would no longer be admissible in any
federal criminal action.
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power and authority and to forever secure the people their persons,
houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and
seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike,
whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force
and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our federal system
with the enforcement of the laws.5 9
Silverthorne v. United States,60 arose out of an illegal search and the
seizure of records of a corporation while two of its officers who had been
indicted were being detained following their arrest. Photographs and copies
of material papers were made and a new indictment was framed based upon
the knowledge thus obtained. Application was made for the return of the
records unlawfully taken. The district court ordered the originals returned
but impounded the photographs and copies. Subpoenas to produce the originals
were then served and the district court, although it had previously found that
all the papers had been seized in violation of the parties' constitutional rights,
ordered the defendants to comply. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower
court's decision, said: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition
of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."' 1
The current attitude toward lawless law enforcement, demonstrated in
Mapp v. Ohio,62 gives new vitality to the claim for exclusion of tainted evi-
dence in all lawsuits, civil as well as criminal. Mapp held that tainted evidence
is excluded by virtue of the Constitution itself not merely by rule of Court.
63
Since the operation of the exclusionary rule is the result of the constitutional
requirements of both the fourth and fourteenth amendments, the former
policy arguments justifying a different rule for civil cases would seem to be
58. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
59. Id. at 391-92. (Emphasis added.)
60. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
61. Id. at 392. (Emphasis added.)
62. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
63. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the Court recognized that the
principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal trials are derived not only
from the Constitution but also from the rules formulated by that Court in its super-
-visory authority over federal courts. These rules have no applicability to the state.
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of little weight.64 If the Government has seized evidence in violation of the
Constitution, the exclusion of the fruits of the seizure would appear to be
required by constitutional command in any type of action.
Reason would seem to dictate that until there is a judicial determination
that the property is forfeited, any private rights in the property should
receive fourth amendment protection, notwithstanding that the forfeiture,
once decreed, relates back to the time of the commission of the offense.
6 5
Since a motion to suppress evidence would precede a determination on the
issue of forfeiture, it should be error for a court, in ruling on the motion,
to assume that title to the property had already passed to the state. This
approach can be justified both on the theory that admission of the evidence
violates the fifth amendment rule against self-incrimination and that the ex-
clusion of the evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the fourth
amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 66
While reason would seem to require the return of property which is not
contraband per se where no legally obtained evidence is available to establish
its use, the question is more difficult where the property involved is contra-
band per se. Contraband per se may be divided into that which is harmless,
e.g., a roulette wheel, and that which represents a potential danger to the
public, e.g., heroin. In some cases, particularly where the latter type of
contraband property is involved, the potential danger to society in failing to
seize the property will override the importance of discouraging violations
of the fourth amendment. 67 Where to draw the line is not always clear,68 but
it would seem that mere suppression of the evidence without a return of the
contraband would be sufficient to prevent flagrant abuse of the police power.
Certainly from an historical point of view, the decision in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan can be considered a consistent result. Once the basic fictions of
64. See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183
(McNaughton rev. 1961). The rationale for the common-law rule was that any evidence
which would enable the court to determine the truth ought to be admissible, and there-
fore the courts would not look behind the evidence to see how it was obtained.
65. This was the position taken by the court in People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253,
294 P.2d 13 (1956).
66. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960).
67. In United States v. 10000 Gallons of Intoxicating Liquor, 287 F. 375 (D.C.
Mass. 1923) the court held that the illegal seizure and detention of spirits by govern-
ment officers cannot be defended or justified by the illegality of the owner's possession.
See also Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920); People v.
Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919).
68. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the Court held that:
[T]he reasonableness of a search is in the first instance a substantive determination
to be made by the trial court from the facts and circumstances of the case and
in the light of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amendment and




statutory forfeiture are accepted-that the res, and not the user, is the
offender, that forfeiture occurs immediately upon commission of the offense,
and that the action is not criminal in nature there can be no other conclusion.
Query, however, whether fiction should prevail over reality, especially where
constitutional rights are in danger of being swept away. Certainly fiction,
in the absence of strong public policy considerations, should not prevail in
the case of forfeiture of goods not in themselves pernicious. As one writer has
said: "[L]ogic rebels at the thought that automobiles used in liquor cases
are more guilty than automobiles used for murder, robbery, or rape."6 9 Chat-
tels do not offend, and if their forfeiture is to be justified it must be as a
penalty inflicted upon their owners.
The court's reasoning in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan seems unsound
because in effect it encourages illegal searches for contraband and could
lead to uncontrolled police surveillance of state borders.70 An illegal search
violates the identical privacy, whether its fruits be used to convict in a criminal
prosecution or to forfeit personal property in a civil action. The constitutional
question here involved is of extreme importance and should not be obscured by
the character of the offense charged. "However much in a particular case
insistence upon such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the
benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance
of short-cut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness.
'71
The broad interpretation of the language of the fourth amendment
coupled with the quasi-criminal nature of forfeiture proceedings dictate that
as between a state's power to collect lawful taxes and the possibility that
some guilty persons will escape punishment by application of the exclusionary
rule, the policies underlying the provisions of the federal and state constitu-
tions should be enforced to prevent further violation of individual rights,
even at the cost of some tax evasion.
RICHARD H. Wix
69. McDonald, Automobile Forfeitures and the Eighteenth Amendment, 10 TEXAS
L. REv. 140, 142 (1932).
70. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Flood in Commonwealth v. One 1958
Plymouth Sedan, 199 Pa. Super. 428, 435, 186 A.2d 52, 56 (1962).
71. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
